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Abstract 
 
We all belong to and identify with many social groups, and recent research has identified 
important individual differences in the psychological management of the relationship 
between these multiple identities. This dissertation examines the relationship between 
Identity Integration (II)—perceptions of one’s multiple social identities as compatible versus 
in conflict—and experiences of decisional conflict—or, indecisiveness. Studies 1 and 2 
showed that low IIs—or, individuals who generally perceive their multiple social identities to 
be in conflict—experienced more decisional conflict. Study 1 found that individuals with 
lower levels of II reported higher levels of regret after a decision, even while controlling for 
trait-level neuroticism. Study 2 found the same relationship across self-reported trait-like, but 
not behavioral or affective, measures of indecisiveness, and across different decision-making 
tasks. Studies 3, 4, and 5 provided evidence for the context-dependence of the link between 
low II and experiences of decisional conflict, suggesting that identity management processes 
underlie this effect. Study 3 found that among employees of a multinational organization, 
lower II between work-related identities is associated with higher levels of self-reported 
indecisiveness at work. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrated that lower II between different cultural 
identities among biculturals and between work and family identities among working 
professionals with families, respectively, is associated with post-decisional negative affect and 
regret, but only in tasks relevant to those identities. Study 6 used an experimental 
manipulation of II, demonstrating that II directly affects post-choice regret, again only in 
decision-making tasks related to those identities. Extending previous research on identity 
	 x 
and decision-making, these results show that psychological management of multiple social 
identities is also an important driver of decision-making experiences.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 DECISION CONFLICT AND IDENTITY CONFLICT 
We live in an increasingly complex world of ample choice options and decisions. 
Though offering decision-makers endless possibilities may increase their sense of autonomy 
and ability to select solutions that best fit their needs and preferences, they can also feel 
burdened by the decision task and experience conflict during the decision-making process, 
post-decision regret, and even indecision, or inability to make any decision at all (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 1999; Schwartz, 2004). Indeed, many decisions can be experienced as conflictual 
when "different reasons pull or push [the decision-maker] in different directions" (Baron & 
Weber, 2001, p.2), leading to “hesitation, vacillation, feelings of uncertainty, and signs of 
acute emotional stress” (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 46). In this dissertation, I suggest that the 
conflict experienced by making decisions can be a byproduct of increasingly multifaceted, 
and potentially conflicting self identities, or how we think of ourselves (Arnett, 2002). In 
short, identity conflict can lead to decision conflict and indecisiveness.  
Take an example from Cutthroat Kitchen, a reality show, in which four chefs compete 
against each other for a large monetary reward in a series of cooking challenges. Each round, 
chefs can sabotage their competitors by deciding whether to spend money bidding on perks 
for themselves (such as being the only chef allowed to use an oven) or impediments for their 
competitors (such as being forced to cook without knives). One episode of the show 
featured a chef called Sandra, who is originally from The Netherlands but grew up in Spain. 
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She summed up how her conflicting cultural identities of being both Dutch and Spanish 
pulled her in different directions during bidding decisions: 
“It’s like balancing my half-Dutch and my half-Spanish part. Because the Spanish 
part would be like: ‘Go, go, go! Spend it!’ But then, I have a Dutch part of me that 
goes: ‘Let them spend their money!’” 
 
Compared to Spanish values, Dutch cultural values encourage pragmatism, including 
saving behavior (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). For Sandra, being unable to 
integrate these two disparate cultural identities, left her feeling torn between Spanish and 
Dutch values. Ultimately, this identity conflict slowed her decision-making. 
1.1.1 Conflict in Decision-Making 
Conflict theory places conflict or “opposing tendencies within the individual” as a 
central process underlying decision-making (Janis & Mann, 1977, p.46). According to this 
theory, the level of conflict created in the decision problem directly affects the type of 
decision-making strategy decision-makers use. As Janis and Mann (1977) put it:  
“…[W]e see man not as a cold fish but as a warm-blooded mammal, not as a rational 
calculator always ready to work out the best solution but as a reluctant decision 
maker—beset by conflict, doubts, and worry, struggling with incongruous longings, 
antipathies, and loyalties…” (p.15)  
 
Many factors influence whether decisions are more or less conflictual, but the 
individual attributes of the decision-maker have been shown to play an important role (e.g., 
Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997). One kind of attributes the individual decision-maker brings 
to the situation that can affect experiences of decision conflict are their unique preferences, 
utilities, and perceived importance ascribed to different choice options. Classic economic 
theorists generally assume that these preference structures, while unique to each individual, 
are fixed and knowable, and decision-makers select options that maximize their own 
expected utility. For example, when someone has to make a decision about buying a car, he 
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or she can weigh the utility they ascribe to different attributes (e.g., price, safety), sum across 
attributes to compute total expected utilities for each choice option, and determine the 
choice that will maximize their own overall utility. In the end, comparisons of expected 
utilities allow decision-makers to easily trade off between options (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). 
From this point of view, decisions are conflictual when expected utilities are undifferentiated 
across multiple options, and the decision-maker is indifferent between the options. In these 
cases, people sometimes defer responsibility of making a decision to a random process (e.g., 
flipping a coin), though these types of decisions have been shown to create a sense of 
psychological conflict (Beattie & Barlas, 2001).  
In contrast to economists, who focus on conflict that arises from individual 
preferences and utilities, psychologists have focused on conflict that arises from self and 
identity. In this stream of work, individuals do not only seek to maximize utility, but also to 
maintain a coherent sense of self. This is evidenced by research showing that people tend to 
change their preferences after a decision to create a consistent sense of self. Perhaps the 
most famous demonstration of this is Festinger’s (1964) theory of cognitive dissonance, 
which shows that, when forced to choose a course of action that is inconsistent with one’s 
preferences, people alter their preferences to maintain consistency between different aspects 
of the self. In a similar set of studies, decision-makers rank objects such as posters or CDs in 
order of preference and then choose between two objects ranked in the middle of the list. 
Presumably, decision-makers are relatively indifferent between these options. Results show 
that, post decision, decision-makers increased their preference for the chosen option and 
decreased their preference for an unchosen option, again to create consistency within the 
self (Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). Along the 
same vein, studies found that ownership of a object led to a stronger association between the 
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object and the self, which in turn led to higher valuation of the object (Morewedge, Shu, 
Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009). For example, after being given a mug to own, individuals asked for 
a higher selling price than they were willing to pay to acquire the mug in the first place 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). These studies suggest that, rather than preferences or 
utilities driving choices, choices also drive one’s preferences. More importantly, it seems that 
people are motivated to change their preference structures in order to reduce conflict and 
maintain a coherent sense of self. In short, a person’s sense of who they are—with all their 
potentially conflicting values, beliefs, goals, experiences, and aspirations—is a crucial 
component of decision conflict. 
1.1.2 Conflict in Identity 
As mentioned, many individual attributes have been shown to be important 
predictors in decision-making. For example, personality traits predict a variety of decision-
making processes and outcomes, ranging from purchasing decisions, processing of choice 
options, perceptions of time during decision-making, and choice satisfaction, just to name a 
few (Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006; Lai, 2011; Misuraca & Teuscher, 2013; Polman, 2010; 
Sandy, Gosling, & Durant, 2011; Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, 
Lyubomirsky, White, & Lehman, 2002). These approaches often portray the person as 
monolithic with stable preferences shaped by their individual attributes. 
However, the self is often dynamic, multifaceted, and even conflicting (Brown, 
1998). Early psychoanalytic theories split the person into various internal psychological 
components including the id, ego, and superego (Freud, 1933/1990). Whereas the id urges 
the person to act on basic impulses, the superego serves as a voice of morality and reason. 
At the heart of the distinction between these components is that they are in conflict or have 
differing urges and aspirations, which the ego must regulate and manage. Social 
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psychological theories have also supported the notion that we all have multiple aspects of 
identity or the self that can pull us in different directions. Markus and Nurius (1986), for 
instance, distinguished between different possible selves—such as the self one hopes to 
become, one fears to become, and the current self (or what one is currently like). Others 
have made the distinction between a private self and a public self, each of which has 
different standards of behavior (Baumeister, 1986; Buss, 1980; Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; 
James, 1890/1983). Along a similar vein, people are often motivated by conflicting impulses 
in crafting their selves and identities—for example, individuals are simultaneously motivated 
to be unique/distinct from others and interconnected/assimilated with others (Brewer, 1991; 
Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).  
Overall, different selves, which can carry various values, goals, and interests, have the 
potential to pull us in different directions during decision-making. This dissertation seeks to 
demonstrate a relationship between a person’s perceived conflict between different selves 
and decisional conflict. In particular, this work provides the first empirical examination of 
how individual differences in the management of multiple identities influence indecisiveness. 
1.2 FROM DECISION CONFLICT TO INDECISIVENESS 
Indecisiveness and the experience of conflict during decision-making is an 
understudied but important part of the decision-making process (Beattie & Barlas, 2001; 
Goldstein, Barlas, & Beattie, 2001). In the earlier example about the bicultural chef, Sandra 
took longer than other contestants to make a bid, in large part because she felt conflicted 
about what she perceived to be two discrepant culturally-prescribed values. Empirically, 
decision conflict and decision latency (or the time it takes to make a choice) seem to be 
closely related. Beattie and Barlas (2001), for instance, asked participants to rate the difficulty 
they experienced when making various hypothetical tradeoffs between everyday items like 
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mall coupons and grocery coupons, and found that decisions in which the decision-maker 
felt more conflicted indeed took longer to make. This extends to other, more affective, 
measures of indecisiveness such as regret, or post-choice negative emotion. Krosch, Figner, 
and Weber (2012), for example, found that hypothetical moral decisions that were 
experienced as more conflictual for the decision-maker resulted in greater post-choice 
negative emotion. In short, the experience of decisional conflict can often be understood as 
indecisiveness.  
1.2.1 Components of Indecisiveness 
Definitions of indecisiveness are broad and span different phases of the decision-
making process. These include failing to make a decision or indecision, taking a long time to 
make a decision (decision latency), experiencing negative affect, and post-choice regret, just 
to name a few (Elyadi, 2006; Frost & Shows, 1993; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002; Goodstein, 
1972; Jones, 1989; Yates, Ji, Oka, Lee, Shinotsuka, & Sieck, 2010). One way to measure 
indecisiveness is through self-report scales. Subsuming several of the components of 
indecisiveness mentioned above, Frost and Shows’ (1993) 15-item Indecisiveness Scale is 
one of the most commonly used self-report measures of indecisiveness (Patalano & 
Wengrovitz, 2006). The scale includes items such as “I try to put off making decisions” 
(indecision), “I usually make decisions quickly” [R] (decision latency), “I become anxious 
when making a decision” (negative affect), and “Once I make a decision, I stop worrying 
about it” [R] (post-choice regret), and has been validated and used across different cultures 
(Swami, Sinniah, Subramaniam, Pillai, Kannan, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2008; Yates et al., 
2010).  
To assess the behavioral components of indecisiveness, research has commonly 
focused on decision latency. Frost and Shows (1993), for instance, asked participants to 
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make a series of hypothetical choices across domains (e.g., selecting one of two college 
courses or choosing one of two free-time activities to pursue) and found that more 
indecisive participants (measured via the Indecisiveness Scale) took significantly longer to 
make their choices in all domains. Similarly, Yates et al. (2010) assessed behavioral 
indecisiveness by the time participants spent selecting between two alternatives in a series of 
common knowledge questions. 
Indecisiveness, or experienced decisional conflict, as the name suggests, is 
predominantly affective and includes subjective perceptions of difficulty, anxiety, less 
happiness, lower confidence, and more regret, even before an outcome of the choice is 
known (e.g., Bui, Krishen, & Bates, 2011; Inbar, Botti, & Hanko, 2011; Inman & 
Zeelenberg, 2002; Kirkebøen & Teigen, 2011; Luce et al., 2001). Regret is defined as “the 
emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our current situation would 
have been better, if only we had decided differently” (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007, p.3). Note 
that in the context of the decision-making process, then, regret can occur after the decision 
is made but before the decision-maker knows objectively whether this was the “right” 
decision. Indeed, decision scholars have recently called attention to the need to study these 
subjective decision experiences that result post-choice but before outcomes of the decision 
are known not only because many real-world decisions, such as choosing a job, for example, 
do not have immediate known outcomes, but also because these negative affective 
experiences can impact the extent to which people pursue or revise their chosen course of 
action (Kirkebøen & Teigen, 2011; Yates & Angott, 2012). As such, much of the current 
research focuses on affective indecisiveness to address an important theoretical and practical 
gap in the decision-making literature and capture the experience of decision conflict.  
Using self-reports to assess post-choice affect, Carmon, Wertenbroch, and 
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Zeelenberg (2003) presented participants with hypothetical scenarios—such as traveling to 
one of two equally desirable vacation spots—and asked them to rate how someone who 
chose between these two options would feel about forgoing the unchosen option along a 
continuum from very positive to very negative. More negative responses are presumably 
indicative of higher post-decision regret and indecisiveness. Although regret is typically 
assessed directly by asking participants to report to what extent they regret their choice (e.g., 
Biu, Krishen, & Bates, 2011; Inbar, Botti, & Hanko, 2011; Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; 
Kirkebøen & Teigen, 2011), other measures include the extent to which the participant 
believes they should have chosen differently (e.g., Biu et al., 2011; Cai & Cude, 2011; Inman 
& Zeelenberg, 2002; Kirkebøen & Teigen, 2011; Patrick, Lancellotti, & Demello, 2009), or 
whether they would be happier with a different choice (e.g., Cai & Cude, 2011; Inman & 
Zeelenberg, 2002). These various ways of defining post-choice regret tend to be highly 
correlated1. Note that given these definitions, the current conceptualization of experienced 
decisional conflict is predominantly negative, yet indecisiveness need not always be a liability 
(see Chapter 8).  
1.2.2 Correlates of Indecisiveness 
 Indecisiveness permeates many important real-world decisions people make and, 
though it may have positive outcomes, it is predominantly an undesirable outcome that 
creates experiences of conflict (Yates et al., 2010). For example, people report feeling 
indecisive deciding on a career (e.g., Gati, Krausz, & Osipow, 1996) or a college major 
																																								 																				
1 Inman and Zeelenberg (2002) found that alphas for items related to regret, intending to change one’s choice, 
and believing one would have been happier with the other choice, were greater than .73 across various 
hypothetical decision scenarios. Using factor analysis, Cai and Cude (2011) found that items measuring regret, 
intending to change one’s choice, believing one should have chosen differently, and believing one would have 
been happier with the other choice about a hypothetical bidding choice loaded onto a single factor that 
explained 61 percent of the variance in their sample.  
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(Gayton, Clavin, Clavin, & Broida, 1994), as well as more trivial, everyday decisions such as 
what to order from a restaurant menu or which activity to do in one’s free time (Germeijs & 
De Boeck, 2002). Importantly, indecisiveness predicts multiple psychological outcomes. For 
instance, empirical research in counseling and clinical psychology has linked indecisiveness 
to pathologies such as depression, perfectionism, obsessive-compulsive behaviors, and 
hoarding behavior (Frost & Gross, 1993; Frost & Shows, 1993; Gayton et al., 1994; Rassin & 
Muris, 2005). Indecisiveness has also consistently been shown to correlate positively with the 
personality trait of neuroticism or low emotional stability (Di Fabio, 2006; Jackson, 
Furnham, & Lawty-Jones, 1999; Milgram & Tenne, 2000). Jackson et al. (1999), for instance, 
demonstrated this association across a diverse sample of students and adults from various 
occupations. 
Indecisiveness has been linked to various psychological processes such as more 
complex and thorough processing of choice options, including consideration of multiple 
perspectives and alternatives (Carmon et al., 2003; Yates et al., 2010), and more experienced 
threat from forgoing choice options (Luce, et al., 1997; Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 2001). 
Extending this literature, I argue below that indecisiveness is also related to identity conflict. 
1.3 FROM IDENTITY CONFLICT TO INDECISIVENSS  
1.3.1 Identity-Based Decision-Making 
Identity and choice are almost synonymous in our understanding of the self. For 
Baumeister (1999), identity is a self-definition comprised of a “mixture of choices” (p.4) we 
use to decide how we represent ourselves to others. Many scholars have expressed similar 
notions that identity and choice are intertwined (Levy, 1959; Oyserman, 2009; Reed, 2002; 
Shavitt & Nelson, 1999; Snibbe & Markus, 2005). People are particularly motivated to 
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express themselves through choices that are consistent with their social identities—senses of 
who we are derived from memberships in groups such as ethnic, national, gender, religious, 
and occupational groups, among others (Kim & Chu, 2011; Oyserman, 2009; Sirgy, 1982; 
Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For example, Latino consumers, when they were ethnic 
minorities in their community, were more likely to prefer a laundry detergent endorsed by a 
spokesperson of the same ethnicity, suggesting that their heightened awareness of their 
ethnic identity prompted a choice consistent with that social group (Deshpande & Stayman, 
1994; Forehand & Deshpande, 2001). 
To the extent that people have multiple social identities—or belong to more than 
one social group—making one identity salient has been shown to affect choice. For example, 
Reed (2004) increased or decreased the importance of people’s family identity by asking 
participants to recall ways in which they are connected to or independent from their families, 
respectively. Participants then rated their intentions to purchase an identity-relevant product 
(i.e., a palm pilot advertised with utilitarian features and the capability of staying in touch 
with family) or an identity-irrelevant product (i.e., a palm pilot with only utilitarian features). 
The results showed that participants whose family identity was made more important 
reported greater intent to purchase the identity-relevant product.  
Similarly, when choosing items from a restaurant menu, Chinese American 
biculturals primed with American culture preferred items that are unique or novel, affirming 
stereotypical American cultural values related to uniqueness. When primed with Chinese 
culture instead, biculturals preferred more traditional dishes, affirming stereotypical Chinese 
values related to conformity (LeBoeuf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010). Social identities have also 
been shown to predict measures of indecisiveness such as post-choice satisfaction and 
regret. Undergraduate business students who decided to subscribe to Business Week instead of 
	 11 
People Magazine, for example, were less satisfied with their choice when their college rather 
than business student identity was made salient (LeBoeuf et al., 2010).  
Importantly, social identities affect choices only in decision domains relevant to 
those identities. For example, Reed (2004) found that people whose scholarly identity was 
made more versus less important only differed in their evaluations of a Smithsonian 
Association membership when the membership was advertised as identity-relevant (i.e., in 
terms of the types of people who are members) but not as identity-irrelevant (i.e., in terms of 
utilitarian features of the membership).  
1.3.2 Identity Integration 
Although many identities have the potential to be conflicting—should Sandra bid 
more to sabotage her opponents (i.e., act consistent with her Spanish identity) or save to 
increase her prize money (i.e., be congruent with her Dutch identity)?—individuals differ in 
the extent to which they perceive them as such. Indeed, different social identities (e.g., 
Spanish vs. Dutch cultural identities) are not inherently conflictual, but subject to individual 
differences in how multiple identities are negotiated, managed, and perceived.  
There are several individual difference constructs that tap into how people perceive 
and manage multiple social identities. For instance, research on immigrants has identified 
different types of cultural identification patterns based on how strongly a person feels 
connected to their home and host cultures, highlighting the possibility that people exposed 
to two cultures can vary in how they manage their multiple cultural identities (Berry, 1990; 
Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987; Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997; Sam & Berry, 2006). 
Social identity complexity assesses the structure of a person’s social identities and the extent 
to which they perceive overlap between social categories (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). High 
social complexity refers to beliefs that multiple social groups share overlapping membership, 
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whereas low social complexity refers to beliefs that multiple social groups are distinct with 
clear differentiating boundaries. Higher social identity complexity has been linked to greater 
tolerance for diversity and acceptance of people from different social categories (Brewer & 
Pierce, 2005; Miller, Brewer, & Arbuckle, 2009).  
A similar concept, Identity Integration (II) refers to the perceived compatibility 
between one’s multiple social identities. Low identity integrators (low IIs) perceive their 
social identities as conflictual and disparate, whereas high identity integrators (high IIs) 
perceive their identities as compatible and integrated. While both low and high IIs identify 
with their multiple social identities and see group membership as an integral part of who 
they are, they differ in their perceptions of the relationship between the different identity 
groups (Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002). II has been used to understand how 
specific populations manage potentially conflicting social identities. For example, Benet-
Martínez and Haritatos (2005) have used II to examine biculturals’ perceived conflict 
between their cultural identities. And Cheng, Sanchez-Burks, and Lee (2008), for instance, 
examined II between gender and professional identities among female engineers (see also 
Darling, Molina, Sanders, Lee, & Zhao, 2008).  
II can also apply to the general population to refer to how people in general manage 
their multiple social identities. Rather than focusing on specific identities (e.g., two cultural 
identities), generalized II taps into the perceived relationships among a person’s multiple social 
identities. The reasoning behind this construct lies in the idea that all individuals, regardless 
of their membership in or identification with any specific combination of social identities, 
can experience conflict between their identities to varying degrees. Initial tests of this 
measure in college student and adult populations have found evidence for its internal 
reliability and validity. Scores on the Generalized II scale correlate positively with scores on 
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II scales tailored to specific identities, particularly bicultural II (which measures perceived 
compatibility between two cultural identities) among biculturals and work-family II (which 
measures perceived compatibility between work and family identities) among working 
professionals with families.  
Studies examining the antecedents of II among biculturals have linked perceived 
conflict between two cultural identities to trait-level neuroticism and suggest that emotional 
instability can predispose individuals to negative cross-cultural experiences (Benet-Martínez 
& Haritatos, 2005). Furthermore, negative cultural experiences may facilitate the perception 
that two cultural identities are discrepant (Cheng & Lee, 2013). These studies suggest that 
neuroticism could contribute to low II.  
Empirical work demonstrates that II is an important moderator between social 
identities and psychological processes related to decision-making (for a review of II among 
biculturals, see Cheng & Lee, in press). For one, research among biculturals shows that those 
with low bicultural II, or those who perceived their cultural identities as in conflict, 
generated more detailed descriptions of cultural stimuli that incorporated multiple 
perspectives (Benet-Martínez, Lee, & Leu, 2006). However, low IIs did not offer more 
complex descriptions when describing culturally-irrelevant stimuli, such as generic 
landscapes. This study suggests that low IIs do not generally process information in more 
complex ways, but only in domains related to the social identities in question.  
Furthermore, low IIs were more likely to resist a group consensus decision, but only 
if the group was wrong (Mok & Morris, 2010). In a series of figure rotation tasks, in which 
participants needed to correctly identify whether the rotated image matched the original, 
Asian American biculturals with higher levels of identity conflict were more likely to choose 
a response option not selected by the majority of their team members when this majority 
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choice was incorrect. In terms of decision-making, this suggests that low IIs may be better 
able to resist a group decision that is wrong because they process information more 
thoroughly and are more open to alternatives during the decision-making process.  
Similar cognitive processes have also been linked to indecisiveness. For instance, 
more complex processing during decision-making has been shown to lead to more negative 
affect post choice, greater decision latency, and indecision (Carmon et al., 2003; Luce et al., 
2001; Yates et al., 2001). Yates et al. (2010) found that when participants narrated their 
thought process during decision-making on general knowledge questions, those who were 
more indecisive were also more thorough. That is, they produced more extensive and 
detailed narrations and provided more arguments for the decision problems. They also 
included multiple perspectives in their thought process, generating more arguments that 
opposed the available choice options as well as their choice. These pathways provide reason 
to speculate that low II would be associated with indecisiveness. 
Recent work on II has also shown that perceptions of identity incompatibilities (or 
low II) are associated with contrastive rather than congruent responses to identity cues 
(Cheng et al., 2006; Mok & Morris, 2009, 2013). For example, Mok and Morris (2013) found 
that Asian American biculturals with low II were more likely to choose items related to their 
Asian identity when primed with American cultural cues and vice versa. These contrast 
effects suggest that the way people experience identity-relevant contexts may be more 
complex than suggested under traditional social identity perspectives. Rather than driving 
behavior consistent with a single salient identity, identity-relevant contexts may also cue 
people’s feelings about the relationships between their identities. As such, having to make 
identity-relevant decisions may be experienced as more conflictual for people with lower 
levels of II. 
	 15 
In line with this notion, research suggests that self-defensive processes underlie the 
association between low II and contrastive responses to identity cues (Mok & Morris, 2013). 
In other words, people who perceive their identities as conflicting and disparate perceive 
situations that emphasize one of their identities as more threatening to their self-concept and 
make choices consistent with the unaffirmed identity in order to restore it (e.g., Baumeister, 
Dale, & Sommer, 1998; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). Instead 
of feeling like the context elicits a corresponding part of their identity, people with low II 
may feel like they lose a part of themselves and feel threatened. As Benet-Martínez and 
Haritatos (2005) note, in comparison to biculturals with high II who have integrated their 
cultural identities, those with low II may feel like they “[have] to choose one culture or the 
other” (p. 1040). By extension, identity-relevant contexts—such as making a decision in an 
identity-relevant domain—should make people with lower levels of II feel more self-threat 
as they stand to lose more (of the self) in these contexts, leading to more experienced 
decisional conflict. Indeed, according to choice tradeoff models of decision-making, more 
threatening decisions—or those in which the decision-maker has more to lose—are also 
associated with more negative emotions (Luce et al., 1997, 2001; see also Carmon et al., 
2003). Applying an identity perspective to these models, making identity-relevant choices, in 
which people give up one self-relevant option for another, should pose a greater threat to 
the self for those whose selves are more disparate and conflicted as they psychologically 
stand to lose more (of themselves). In short, based on these affective links, there is further 
reason to believe low IIs would be more indecisive. 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT STUDIES 
The current studies aim to bridge research on individual differences in identity 
integration (or II) and indecisiveness. Below I outline the specific hypotheses and designs of 
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a series of six studies to examine this relationship. 
1.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Establishing a Link between Low II and Indecisiveness 
 As mentioned, psychological processes that have been associated with low II—such 
as complex and thorough processing, including consideration of multiple perspectives and 
alternatives, and self-threat in the face of choice (Benet-Martínez et al., 2006; Mok & Morris, 
2010, 2013)—have also been linked to greater decision conflict (Carmon et al., 2003; Luce et 
al., 1997, 2001; Yates et al.; 2010). Based on this literature, I propose that low IIs may 
experience higher levels of indecisiveness. I predict that people with low II—or people who 
generally perceive greater conflict between their various social identities—will be more 
indecisive than people with high II—or people who generally perceive less conflict between 
their various social identities (Hypothesis 1). Study 1 provides a first step in testing this 
association. Study 2 replicates Study 1 using multiple decision-making tasks and various 
operationalizations of indecisiveness.   
1.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Context-Dependence of the Effect  
I further predict that the relationship between II and indecisiveness will be 
moderated by the domain of the decision-making task. Specifically, if decision conflict is 
driven by identity conflict, I would expect low IIs to demonstrate higher levels of 
indecisiveness only when the decision-making tasks are related to the social identities. This 
idea is consistent with several past studies showing that II’s effects on psychological 
processes are specific to tasks relevant to the social identities at hand (e.g., Benet-Martínez et 
al., 2006) and that social identities affect decision-making only in identity-relevant domains, 
perhaps because they become most salient in these types of contexts (e.g., Reed, 2004).  
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Thus, in addition to examining people’s general level of II across their many social 
identities, I also examine II between specific identities, or perceptions of two specific social 
identities as being in conflict or not. I hypothesize that, compared to tasks that are not 
relevant to the specific identities, the relationship between II and indecisiveness will be 
stronger in tasks that are identity-relevant (Hypothesis 2). Study 3 provides the first 
examination of this hypothesis in a real-world organizational setting. Studies 4 and 5 test this 
hypothesis using experimental designs.  
1.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Direct Effect of Low II on Indecisiveness 
Lastly, despite the theoretical links between identity conflict and decision conflict, it 
remains to be seen whether identity management strategies can have a direct effect on the 
decision-making process. Building on Studies 1-5, I predict that identity integration has a 
direct effect on indecisiveness (Hypothesis 3). I test this proposition in Study 6 by 
experimentally manipulating II and examining indecisiveness in both an identity-relevant and 
identity-irrelevant task. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the direct effect should only hold in 
the identity-relevant domain, further supporting the notion that these effects are due to 
identity processes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1—GENERALIZED IDENTITY INTEGRATION AND POST-CHOICE 
REGRET 
Study 1 examines the relationship between “generalized” II—or the extent to which 
people perceive their various social identities to be generally compatible versus in conflict—
and an affective component of indecisiveness: post-choice regret. Although generalized II is 
a relatively new measure in the II literature, it appears to tap into similar individual 
differences in the management of multiple identities as previously established measures of 
specific II (e.g., among two cultural identities in biculturals; Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 
2005; Benet-Martínez et al., 2002). As such, preliminary tests of the Generalized II scale have 
shown significant positive correlations with other measures of II such as Bicultural II among 
biculturals and Work-Family II among working professionals with families.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, previous research has consistently shown a 
positive relationship between indecisiveness and neuroticism (e.g., Jackson et al., 1999). 
Neuroticism is also related to identity conflict (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005). Trait 
neuroticism is therefore included as a control variable.   
Overall, Study 1 tests Hypothesis 1: Individuals with lower II will exhibit higher 
levels of post-choice regret after a decision-making task, and that this effect will be apparent 
when controlling for trait-level neuroticism. 
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2.1 METHOD 
2.1.1 Participants 
Two hundred forty-six undergraduates (59% women; Mage = 19.7 years, SDage = 2.2 
years) at a large Midwestern university participated in the study for partial course credit. The 
majority of participants (72.0%) identified as White/Caucasian; 16.3% Asian/Asian 
American; 4.9% Black/African American; 3.3% Hispanic/Latino/a; and 3.9% identified as 
Other. 
2.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
The study consisted of two parts. Participants completed each part one week apart. 
The first part was an online survey that included measures of II and Neuroticism. To assess 
generalized II (or people’s general perceptions of compatibility between their identities), 
participants rated their agreement on 10 items using a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Examples of items include “I am often conflicted between 
my different selves” [R] and “My different selves blend together seamlessly” (see Appendix 
A). These items were modified based on existing measures of II (e.g., Benet-Martínez & 
Haritatos, 2005; Cheng & Lee, 2009; Darling, et al., 2008; Sacharin, Lee, & Gonzalez, 2009). 
For example, the item “I keep my different selves separate” [R] is adapted from the item 
used to measure cultural II among biculturals “I keep Chinese and American cultures 
separate” (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005). This method of adapting the II scale for 
different samples has been used in previous research to create multiple, reliable measures of 
II (Cheng & Lee, 2009; Cheng et al., 2008; Darling et al., 2008; Sacharin et al., 2009). Ratings 
across the 10 items were averaged to give each participant a single score of II (α = .75), with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of perceived integration among multiple identities (1.90 
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– 6.60, M = 4.69, SD = .81). Then participants were asked to rate two items used to assess 
neuroticism on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)—“I see 
myself as anxious, easily upset” and “I see myself as calm, emotionally stable” [R] (see 
Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003 for more details about this scale). Scores across the two 
items were averaged to give each participant a single score on neuroticism (α = .68; M = 
3.41, SD = 1.34).  
 One week later, participants completed a decision-making task. The procedure was 
adapted from choice justification paradigms where participants have to choose between two 
alternatives that are similarly preferred (e.g., Kitayama et al., 2004). Typically, participants are 
asked to list alternatives according to their preferences and then have to choose between two 
options relatively in the middle of the list. This creates the potential for the choice to be 
difficult and for greater variability in indecisiveness. Furthermore, many real world decisions 
are made in this way. For instance, although a job candidate may prefer to work for one 
company over another (and likely has a list of several top employers they would like to work 
for), constraints and chance (such as not being offered the job) can ultimately drive the 
choice down to options neither at the top nor bottom of the list. 
For the decision-making task in the current study, participants were first asked to list 
features of their ideal job (such as industry, location, hours, and job responsibilities, for 
example), and then rank order these features in order of importance. Then, participants were 
asked to imagine that they had received two job offers—the first offer had their third- but 
not fourth-ranked feature, and the second offer had their fourth- but not third-ranked 
feature. Participants indicated which of the two job offers they would take.  
After completing this decision-making task, participants completed a 5-item measure 
of post-choice regret drawn from previous research (e.g., Bui et al., 2011). This measure 
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includes (a) self-reported regret, (b) perceptions that they should and wished they had 
chosen differently, (c) reports of whether they would choose differently, and (d) whether 
they would be happier with the other choice option. All items of the scale are listed in 
Appendix B. Using a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), 
participants indicated their agreement to items such as “To what extent do you wish you had 
chosen the other organization?” and “If I could do it over again, I would change my choice 
to the other organization” (α = .82). Higher scores indicated higher levels of post-choice 
regret (1.00 – 6.00, M = 2.66, SD = .90). 
2.2 RESULTS 
The correlation between II and neuroticism was significant (r = −.33, p < .001). 
Neuroticism was not related to post-choice regret (r = .06; p = .34). To examine the 
prediction that II would be negatively related to regret, controlling for neuroticism, post-
choice regret was regressed on generalized II and neuroticism in a simultaneous linear 
regression, (R2 = .02; F(2, 243) = 2.53, p = .082). II was a significant predictor of regret 
(bunstandardized = −.152, p = .043, 95% CI [−.30, −.01]), such that lower levels of II were 
associated with greater self-reported post-choice regret, even when controlling for 
neuroticism, which did not significantly predict regret (bunstandardized = .010, p = .822, 95% CI 
[−.08, .10]). 
2.3 DISCUSSION 
Study 1 supported the predicted association between low II and indecisiveness 
(Hypothesis 1) and further ruled out trait neuroticism as a potential alternative explanation 
for this link. Thus, this study suggests that perceiving one’s multiple social identities to be in 
conflict is related to experiencing conflict in making decisions, regardless of one’s overall 
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negative affective disposition. Still, it remains to be seen if low II is also associated with 
other aspects of indecisiveness and in different decision contexts as well as whether identity 
management strategies drive indecisiveness. Study 2 addressed the former by including a 
broader set of measures in addition to affect to capture indecisiveness and using different 
decision-making tasks. As such, Study 2 aimed to replicate Study 1’s findings and provide 
further support for Hypothesis 1.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2—GENERALIZED IDENTITY INTEGRATION AND 
INDECISIVENESS 
Organizations often require individuals to not only generate new or creative ideas 
but also make decisions around which of these to present, implement, or pursue (Sanchez-
Burks, Karlesky, & Lee, 2014). I use this common organizational problem as inspiration for 
the decision-making tasks in Study 2, to test the generalizability of the association between 
low II and indecisiveness across other decision domains from the one used in Study 1. Study 
2 also added additional measures of indecisiveness, including self-report, behavioral, and 
affective measures to test whether low II relates to indecisiveness broadly. As in Study 1, I 
expected participants with low II to exhibit higher levels of self-report, behavioral, and 
affective measures of indecisiveness (Hypothesis 1). I expected to find these relationships in 
both decision-making domains. 
3.1 METHOD 
3.1.1 Participants 
One hundred fourteen undergraduates (65% women; Mage = 18.5 years; SDage = .77 
years) at a large Midwestern university participated in the study for partial course credit. The 
majority of participants (67.2%) identified as White/Caucasian followed by 15.5% 
Asian/Asian American, 4.3% Black/African American, 3.4% Hispanic/Latino/a, 3.4% 
Biracial/Multiracial, and 6.0% unknown. 
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3.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed all measures in an online survey. To assess generalized II, 
participants first completed the same 10-item measure used in Study 1 (α = .81; see 
Appendix A). For the current sample, II scores ranged from 2.25 to 6.92 (M = 4.67, SD = 
.85). 
After completing the II scale, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
decision-making domains. In one condition, participants were asked to list as many modes of 
transportation as possible (Hirt, Devers, & McCrae, 2008). In the second condition, 
participants were instructed to list as many uses for a brick as possible (Chermahini, 
Hickendorff, & Hommel, 2012; Guilford, 1967). Similar to Study 1, participants were asked 
to rank order their top five ideas.  
To measure indecisiveness, participants first completed the 15-item self-report 
Indecisiveness Scale (Frost & Shows, 1993; see Appendix B). Using a 5-point Likert-type 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), participants rated their agreement on items 
such as “I try to put off making decisions” and “It seems that deciding on the most trivial 
thing takes me a long time” (α = .89). Higher scores indicate higher levels of self-reported 
indecisiveness (1.47 – 4.47, M = 3.00, SD = .67). 
Second, participants were presented with their third- and fourth-ranked ideas and 
asked to make a hypothetical choice about which one of their ideas they would like to enter 
in a creativity contest. Decision latency, as another indicator of indecisiveness, was measured 
by the time it took participants to make a decision (4.6 − 90.74 seconds, M = 15.86, SD = 
13.14). Third, participants indicated their post-choice regret using the same five items used 
in Study 1 (α = .87; see Appendix B). Averages across the five items ranged from 1.00 to 
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4.60 in the current sample (M = 1.96, SD = .89). This constitutes an affective measure of 
indecisiveness. 
3.2 RESULTS 
Intercorrelations between the three measures of indecisiveness—self-report 
indecisiveness, behavioral decision latency, and affective post-choice regret—were not 
significant: r = .05 (p = .66) between decision latency and regret; r = −.17 (p = .10) between 
self-report indecisiveness and decision latency; and r = .19 (p = .07) between self-report 
indecisiveness and regret. 
All subsequent analyses were conducted using the PROCESS Macro (Version 2.13) 
in SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Fourteen participants who did not complete all relevant measures 
were dropped from these analyses. To test the hypothesis that low II would be associated 
with indecisiveness across decision tasks, three separate moderation models (Model 1) were 
specified—one per dependent variable: self-reported indecisiveness, decision latency, and 
post-choice regret—in which each respective measure of indecisiveness was entered as the 
dependent variable with II, task condition (transportation vs. brick), and their interaction 
entered as predictors.  
For self-reported indecisiveness, the overall model was significant (R2 = .12; F(3, 96) 
= 4.22, p = .008). II was a significant predictor of scores on the Indecisiveness Scale 
(bunstandardized = −.47, p = .044, 95% CI [−.92, −.01]), indicating that lower levels of II are 
associated with greater indecisiveness, regardless of decision task (bunstandardized = −.73, p = .364, 
95% CI [−2.31, .86]). The interaction between II and task was also non-significant (bunstandardized 
= .16, p = .330, 95% CI [−.17, .50]). This pattern of results supported Hypothesis 1. 
For behavioral decision latency, the overall model was not significant (R2 = .03; F(3, 
96) = 1.13, p = .342). Contrary to prediction, II was not a significant predictor of the time it 
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took participants to make a decision (bunstandardized = −1.27, p = .784, 95% CI [−10.47, 7.92]). 
Neither task (bunstandardized = 6.36, p = .696, 95% CI [−25.83, 38.56]) nor the interaction between 
II and task significantly predicted decision latency (bunstandardized = −.85, p = .805, 95% CI 
[−7.63, 5.94]). These findings did not support Hypothesis 1. 
 Lastly, for post-decisional regret, the overall model was significant (R2 = .14; F(3, 
93) = 5.19, p = .002). However, as with decision latency, none of the predictors was 
significant: II (bunstandardized = −.23, p = .451, 95% CI [−.82, .37]); task (bunstandardized = .64, p = .549, 
95% CI [−1.47, 2.75]); and the interaction (bunstandardized = −.12, p = .582, 95% CI [−.56, .32]). 
These findings also did not support Hypothesis 1, showing no relationship between II and 
post-choice regret across the two task conditions. 
	
3.3 DISCUSSION 
	 Study 2’s findings were decidedly mixed. Although lower levels of II were associated 
with greater self-reported indecisiveness on the Indecisiveness Scale regardless of decision 
task, as predicted (Hypotheses 1), the same effect was not found for behavioral and affective 
measures of indecisiveness. Perhaps generalized II is a better predictor of similarly general 
notions of indecisiveness—such as those captured by the Indecisiveness Scale, which is 
often also conceived as a stable personality trait (Frost & Shows, 1993). Surprisingly, Study 2 
did not replicate the link between low generalized II and post-choice regret (affective 
indecisiveness) found in Study 1. This may be because the job scenario task used in Study 1 
was more likely to elicit negative affective responses as it may have proved a particularly 
tangible or salient activity for undergraduate participants. As such, the tasks used in Study 2 
may have presented a particularly rigorous test of Hypothesis 1. Nonetheless, creative idea 
generation tasks have been used widely in previous research as they have real-world 
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applicability (e.g., Hirt et al., 2008) and for the present set of studies provide useful ways of 
probing various aspects of the decision context (see Studies 4, 5, and 6). 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that decision latency also showed no relationship to II. 
Although this is a common conception of what it means to be indecisive (and even appears 
in several items on the Indecisiveness Scale), participants with lower II did not take longer to 
make choices in these particular tasks. Though this may again point to the nature of the tasks 
used, it can also suggest that deliberation may not be an underlying mechanism for the 
relationship between II and indecisiveness. Rather, and more consistent with Study 1, low IIs 
may be particularly prone to the experience of indecisiveness—i.e., feeling conflicted, which 
they recognize as difficulty in making decisions (self-reported indecisiveness; Study 2) and 
feeling worse after making a choice (post-choice regret; Study 1). Overall, Studies 1 and 2 
suggest that there is some evidence for Hypothesis 1—that people who feel conflicted about 
their multiple selves also feel conflicted when making decisions. However, it is unclear what 
the role of identity management strategies is in this relationship. To test the role of II more 
precisely, Studies 3-6 focus on perceptions of identity conflict between specific identities to 
predict indecisiveness in particular, identity-relevant contexts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 3—IDENTITY INTEGRATION AND INDECISIVENESS AT WORK 
Using a working/adult sample, Study 3 extends the previous findings to a real-world 
organizational context. Specifically, I collected data from Mexican employees working for a 
Mexican branch of a German company. I assessed II by measuring integration of two 
identities that are relevant to these employees at work—their “foreign” organizational 
identity (German) and “local” cultural identity (Mexican). Study 3 examines Hypothesis 2 by 
testing the proposition that individuals with lower II among work-related identities will be 
more indecisive at work.  
4.1 METHOD 
4.1.1 Participants 
Employees of a local subsidiary of a German automotive company in Mexico were 
asked to participate in a 5-minute online survey. Participation was solicited by the employee’s 
supervisor, but it was voluntary and participants were ensured anonymity. A total of 37 
employees (90% response rate; 49% women; Mage = 36.2 years; SDage = 7.3 years) took part 
in the survey. All participants were Mexican nationals and had worked at the organization or 
the subsidiary for at least 1 year (12 – 332 months, Mtenure = 120 months, SDtenure = 70 
months). Participants from all departments (such as marketing, sales, and aftersales) and 
across various positions were contacted, but this information was not collected to preserve 
participants’ anonymity. The organization is German and the subsidiary uses standardized 
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rules and policies from the German headquarters, but the official language of the subsidiary 
is Spanish.  
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Because participants’ first language is Spanish, I developed an online survey in 
Spanish. All measures and survey instructions were translated into Spanish and back-
translated into English. First, participants completed a 4-item measure of Foreign-Local II to 
assess perceived compatibility between their foreign (German) organizational identity and 
their local (Mexican) cultural identity (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Benet-Martínez et 
al., 2002; see Appendix A for all items). As mentioned, tailoring II scales to examine 
integration between different types of identity is a common practice in past research (e.g., 
Cheng & Lee, 2009; Cheng et al., 2008; Darling et al., 2008; Sacharin et al., 2009). Following 
this precedent, existing measures of II were adapted and modified to address these specific 
identities. For example, an item on a previously established gender-professional II scale 
(Darling et al., 2008) “I feel conflicted between my identity as a woman and my identity as a 
math/science major” was modified to say “At work, I feel conflicted between my identity as 
a Mexican and my identity as an employee of a German company” [R]. Participants rated II 
between their foreign organizational identity and their local cultural identity on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The four items were averaged to 
form a single Foreign-Local II score (α = .70). Higher scores indicated greater perceived 
identity compatibility, with scores in the sample ranging from 2.50 to 7.00 (M = 5.85, SD = 
1.13).  
Participants also completed a shortened and modified version of the Indecisiveness 
Scale (Frost & Shows, 1993; see Appendix B for all items). The scale was reduced from 15 to 
5 items to make the survey shorter and improve response rates. The five items were selected 
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to include a range of definitions of indecisiveness (e.g., “At work, it seems that deciding on 
the most trivial thing takes me a long time” taps into decision latency and “At work, after I 
have chosen or decided something, I often believe I've made the wrong choice or decision” 
captures regret) as well as enable items to apply to the work domain. These five items were 
qualified by the phrase “at work” to tap into indecisiveness within the work domain 
specifically. Participants rated their agreement to each item from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The items were averaged to form a single indecisiveness measure (α = .66). 
Higher scores indicate higher levels of indecisiveness (1.00 – 3.40, M = 1.71, SD = .62). 
4.2 RESULTS 
To test the prediction that lower levels of II would be associated with greater 
indecisiveness, I conducted a multiple linear regression in which scores on the Indecisiveness 
Scale were regressed simultaneously on II and organizational tenure. The overall model was 
significant (R2 = .16; F(2, 34) = 4.36, p = .021). Only II (bunstandardized = -.182, p = .040, 95% CI 
[-.36, -.01]) but not tenure (bunstandardized = .00, p = .079, 95% CI [-.01, .00]) was a significant 
predictor of indecisiveness scores. That is, independent of the time an employee had worked 
for the organization, the perception that one’s local cultural identity is incompatible with 
one’s foreign organizational identity was related to higher levels of experienced 
indecisiveness at work. 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
Unlike Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 used an organizational sample to examine the 
association between II and indecisiveness in a real-world workplace context. Although many 
factors other than the psychological management of identities may shape the experiences 
associated with decision-making at work, these findings provided some initial support for the 
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hypothesis that lower II is associated with greater experienced decisional conflict. To the 
extent that local national and foreign organizational cultural identities were relevant to 
decision-making at work in this sample, these findings also suggest that identity management 
matters particularly for identity-relevant decisions. To examine the relationship between II 
and indecisiveness in a more controlled setting and to provide a more rigorous test of 
Hypothesis 2—or the proposition that the relationship between II and indecisiveness will be 
apparent only in tasks that are identity-relevant—Studies 4 and 5 used an experimental 
design to randomly assign biculturals or working professionals with families, respectively, to 
complete an identity-relevant or identity-irrelevant decision-making task. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 4—THE ROLE OF IDENTITY-RELEVANT DECISIONS IN THE 
CULTURAL DOMAIN 
Studies 4 and 5 test the proposition that individual differences in II will predict 
indecisiveness more strongly when the integrated versus conflicting identities are relevant to 
the decision-making task (Hypothesis 2). Thus, these studies examine how II of specific 
identities relates to indecisiveness in specific contexts. Based on previous research focusing 
on bicultural identities (e.g., Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005), Study 4 focuses on people’s 
psychological management of two cultural identities. In particular, I predicted that 
participants who perceive their identities as incompatible and in conflict will experience 
higher levels of indecisiveness; but this effect will only be apparent in decision tasks relevant 
to the cultural domain.  
5.1 METHOD 
5.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 106 self-identified biculturals (34% women; Mage = 23.4 years; SDage 
= 6.5 years) recruited through subject pools on the campus of a large Midwestern university 
and from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk site in the U.S. and compensated for their 
participation. The majority of participants (71.7%) identified as Asian/Asian American, 
followed by 13.2% White/Caucasian; 5.7% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; 4.7% 
Hispanic/Latino/a; 3.4% Biracial/Multiracial; and 1.9% Black/African American. 
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5.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed all measures in an online survey. First, consistent with 
theoretical conceptions that identity is at least in part self-ascribed (e.g., Stryker & Burke, 
2000), participants self-identified their cultural identities, or the cultural groups to which they 
belong and with which they identify. Then, they completed a 3-item Bicultural II scale that 
measures perceived integration versus conflict between their two cultural groups (Benet-
Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Benet-Martínez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; Cheng et al., 2008). Using a 
7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), participants rated their 
agreement to items such as “I feel conflicted between my identity as a(n) [Culture 1] and my 
identity as a(n) [Culture 2]” [R], where “Culture 1” and “Culture 2” were replaced with the 
self-identified cultural groups they indicated in the previous section (see Appendix A for all 
scale items). Each participant’s ratings were averaged to form a single score of II where 
higher scores indicated greater integration of the two cultural identities (α = .72; range = 
1.33−7.00, M = 4.54, SD = 1.29). 
In a between-subjects design, participants were then randomly assigned to either an 
identity-relevant or an identity-irrelevant decision-making task identical to the ones used in 
Study 2. In the identity-relevant condition, participants engaged in a decision-making task 
within the cultural domain. Specifically, they were asked to list as many creative modes of 
transportation as possible (Hirt et al., 2008). Modes of transportation are often associated 
with visible or explicit aspects of culture and can vary remarkably from one culture to the 
next (e.g., Ward, Okura, Kennedy, & Kojima, 1998); as such, this task has cultural relevance. 
In the identity-irrelevant condition, participants were asked to list as many uses for a brick as 
possible (Chermahini et al., 2012; Guilford, 1967); this task is not relevant to people’s 
cultural identities.  
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Participants then ranked their top five ideas, were presented with their third- and 
fourth-ranked idea in counterbalanced order, and were asked to choose their best idea from 
these two. They then reported their post-choice negative affect on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad) (range = 1.00−5.00, M = 2.70, SD = .91) (e.g., Carmon et al., 
2003).  
To expand upon Study 2’s design and assess aspects of the particular choice 
tradeoffs that may affect the difficulty of the decision and hence indecisiveness (e.g., 
Chatterjee & Heath, 1996), two independent coders blind to the hypothesis rated each 
participant’s third- and fourth-ranked ideas for quality and dissimilarity. In accordance with 
definitions of creativity (e.g., Guilford, 1967) and as a way to gauge overall quality of the 
choice options, coders rated each idea for how novel/original and feasible/useful it was on a 
5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all novel/feasible) to 5 (extremely novel/feasible). To obtain 
an overall rating of option quality per participant, each coder’s ratings were averaged across 
the two ideas. To gauge how similar or dissimilar the two choice options were, coders also 
assigned a score on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (very similar) to 5 (very dissimilar) to each 
choice option pair. Inter-rater reliabilities were acceptable for both the quality score (α = .65) 
and the dissimilarity score (α = .67) and thus the coders’ ratings were averaged to create a 
single quality (range = 1.00−5.00, M = 2.42, SD = .87) and a single dissimilarity (range = 
1.00−4.50, M = 2.38, SD = .90) score for each participant. 
5.2 RESULTS 
All analyses were conducted using the PROCESS Macro (Version 2.13) in SPSS 
(Hayes, 2013). Thirty-one participants who did not complete all relevant measures were 
dropped from the analyses. To test the proposition that II would be associated with 
indecisiveness, specifically negative affect, only for an identity-relevant decision but not an 
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identity-irrelevant decision, a moderation model (Model 1) was specified in which post-
choice negative affect was entered as the dependent variable with II, task condition 
(transportation vs. brick), and their interaction entered as predictors. To account for various 
features of particular tradeoffs that may affect decision-making, the scores of choice option 
quality and dissimilarity were entered as control variables. The number of ideas generated 
was also entered as a control, to account for any possible effects of choice set size on 
decision-making (e.g., Su, Chen, & Zhao, 2009).  
The overall model was marginally significant (R2 = .16; F(6, 68) = 2.24, p = .050). II 
was a significant predictor of negative affect (bunstandardized = -.65, p = .004, 95% CI [-1.08, -.22]), 
indicating that lower levels of II are associated with greater post-choice negative affect. Task 
condition was also a significant predictor of affect (bunstandardized = -1.83, p = .009, 95% CI [-
3.18, -.48]) such that participants tended to report greater post-choice negative affect after 
the transportation task. These main effects, however, were qualified by a significant 
interaction between II and task (bunstandardized = .36, p = .013, 95% CI [.08, .64]). As expected, 
simple slopes analyses showed that II was a significant predictor of post-choice negative 
affect for the identity-relevant (cultural/transportation) task (bunstandardized = -.29, p = .003, 95% 
CI [-.48, -.10]), but not the identity-irrelevant (non-cultural/brick) task (bunstandardized = .07, p = 
.524, 95% CI [-.14, .27]). Figure 1 displays this interaction effect. 
 
Figure 1. Interaction of II and task on post-choice negative affect among biculturals (Study 
4). Means are plotted at one standard deviation below and above the mean. ** p < .01 
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5.3 DISCUSSION 
Study 4 found support for Hypothesis 2—the prediction that low II would be 
associated with indecisiveness only in decisions that are relevant to the identities. This 
suggests that at least for affective components of indecisiveness, identity conflict may be 
transferred to relevant (but not irrelevant) decision contexts. Similarly to Study 1, which 
ruled out generalized negative affect as an explanation of the II-indecisiveness link, Study 4 
also suggests that specific aspects of the choice set that are typically associated with more 
conflictual decision-making such as quality or number of the choice options (e.g., Chatterjee 
& Heath, 1996), do not appear to account for greater experienced negative affect. That is, II 
appears to be a particularly strong predictor of negative affect in decision-making. To test 
whether this relationship holds in a different sample and a more expansive measure of 
negative affect more closely related to indecisiveness—regret—Study 5 tests Hypothesis 2 in 
a sample of working professionals with families.  
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CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 5— THE ROLE OF IDENTITY-RELEVANT DECISIONS IN THE 
WORK/FAMILY DOMAIN 
Study 5 provides additional support for Hypothesis 2 by examining different 
identities within a different sample. Given the increasing difficulties of having both a career 
and a family and the relevance of these identities to organizational life (Dumas & Sanchez-
Burks, 2015), Study 5 replicates the findings from Study 4 in a sample of working 
professionals with families. I predict that participants who perceive their work and family 
identities as incompatible and in conflict will exhibit higher levels of indecisiveness, but only 
in decision tasks related to work/family balance.  
6.1 METHOD 
6.1.1 Participants 
One hundred eleven self-identified full-time working professionals with families 
(59% women; Mage = 36.7 years; SDage = 11.1 years) participated in an online study. 
Following common ways of sampling representative populations with work experience 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk site in the U.S. and received monetary compensation for their participation. The 
majority of participants (74%) identified as White/Caucasian; 10.8% as Black/African 
American; 9.9% as Asian/Asian American; 1.8% as Hispanic/Latino/a; 1.8% as Native 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; 0.9% as Biracial/Multiracial; and 0.9% did not identify with any 
of the categories provided.  
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6.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
 Study 5 followed a similar design to Study 4. Participants completed the same 3-item 
measure of perceived identity conflict, but tailored to their work and family identities (Benet-
Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Benet-Martínez et al., 2002; Darling et al., 2008). Participants 
rated their agreement on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
to items such as “I feel conflicted between my identity as a working professional and my 
identity as a family person” [R] (see Appendix A). Scores were averaged across the items, 
giving each participant a single score of Work-Family II (α = .77; range = 1.00−7.00, M = 
4.57, SD = 1.43). Higher Work-Family II scores indicated greater integration and lower 
conflict between work and family identities.  
 As in Study 4, Study 5 used a between-subjects experimental design in which 
participants were randomly assigned to either an identity-relevant or an identity-irrelevant 
decision-making task. In the identity-relevant condition, participants engaged in a decision-
making task within the work/family domain. Specifically, they were asked to list as many 
creative things to do on vacation as possible. Given the increasing sociocultural dialog 
around work/family balance (e.g., Dumas & Sanchez-Burks, 2015) and the common 
perception that vacation is often a time for employed adults to spend with family yet stay 
connected to the office (PR Newswire, 2013), this task falls within the work/family domain 
and is therefore identity-relevant. The identity-irrelevant condition was identical to Study 4. 
As with cultural identities, uses for a brick are not relevant to people’s work or family 
identities.  
Participants then ranked their top five ideas and were asked to pick either their third- 
or fourth-ranked ideas, which were presented in counterbalanced order, as their best idea. 
Two different independent coders blind to the hypothesis rated the participants’ third- and 
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fourth-ranked ideas for quality and dissimilarity using the same criteria as in Study 4. Inter-
rater reliabilities were high for both the quality score (α = .73) and the dissimilarity score (α 
= .77) and raters’ scores were averaged to create a single quality (range = 1.00−4.75, M = 
2.32, SD = .88) and a single dissimilarity (range = 1.00−5.00, M = 2.97, SD = 1.23) score for 
each participant. 
To expand upon the single-item measure of post-choice negative affect used in Study 
4, participants completed a 5-item measure of post-choice regret drawn from previous 
research and similar to that used in Studies 1 and 2 (e.g., Bui et al., 2011; see Appendix B for 
all scale itemsUsing a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), 
participants indicated their agreement to items such as “To what extent do you wish you had 
chosen your other idea?” and “I would be happier if I had chosen my other idea” (α = .92). 
Higher scores indicated higher levels of experienced post-choice regret (range = 1.00−5.60, 
M = 2.31, SD = 1.15). 
6.2 RESULTS 
To test the prediction that lower II would be associated with higher levels of 
indecisiveness, specifically post-choice regret here, in identity-relevant decision tasks only 
(Hypothesis 2), identical analyses to Study 4 were conducted using the PROCESS Macro 
(Version 2.13) in SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Fourteen participants who did not complete all 
relevant measures were dropped from these analyses. A moderation model (Model 1) with 
regret as the dependent variable and II, task condition (vacation vs. brick), and their 
interaction entered as predictors. To control for various choice set features, the scores of 
choice option quality, dissimilarity, and choice set size were entered as control variables.  
The overall model was significant (R2 = .18; F(6, 90) = 3.33, p = .005). II was a 
significant predictor of post-choice regret (bunstandardized = -.55, p = .015, 95% CI [-.99, -.11]), 
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indicating that lower levels of II were associated with greater post-choice regret. This main 
effect, however, was qualified by a significant interaction between II and task (bunstandardized = 
.33, p = .041, 95% CI [.01, .65]), which is shown in Figure 2. Supporting Hypothesis 2, 
simple slopes analyses showed that II was a significant predictor of regret for the identity-
relevant (work-family/vacation) task (bunstandardized = -.22, p = .017, 95% CI [-.40, -.04]), but not 
the identity-irrelevant (non-work-family/brick) task (bunstandardized = .11, p = .399, 95% CI [-.15, 
.38]). 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of II and task on post-choice regret among working professionals with 
families (Study 5). Means are plotted at one standard deviation below and above the mean.  
* p < .05 
 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
Study 5 provided further evidence that the association between low II and 
indecisiveness, particularly affective components here, is specific to decisions relevant to 
those identities (Hypothesis 2). Taken together, Studies 4 and 5 thus suggest that how people 
feel about the decisions they make may be a result of the way they psychologically manage 
identities applicable to that choice domain. Given that this effect was observed across two 
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different identity domains—cultural and work/family identities—suggested that it is unlikely 
that factors unique to particular identities are driving experiences of decisional conflict. 
Similarly, it did not appear that features specific to the choice set such as option quality, 
dissimilarity, and size affected participants’ responses. This suggests that at least affective 
components of indecisiveness are subjective and may be a result of an identity-relevant 
decision domain cuing senses of conflict for people who dispositionally associate these 
identities with conflict (i.e., have lower II).  
Because II is traditionally conceptualized as a stable individual difference (Benet-
Martínez & Haritatos, 2005), Studies 1-5 measured II using self-reports and ascertained 
associations between II and indecisiveness. However, the question of whether these 
perceptions of identity incompatibility (low II) may cause negative post-decisional 
experiences remains unanswered. Indeed, given that levels of II can also be shifted at least 
temporarily (Cheng & Lee, 2013), indecisiveness should be malleable based on how people 
think about the relationship between their identities. Study 6 therefore experimentally 
manipulated II to examine the proposition that low II would lead to indecisiveness, again 
measured affectively, in an identity-relevant domain (Hypothesis 3).  
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CHAPTER 7 
STUDY 6—DIRECT EFFECT OF IDENTITY INTEGRATION ON 
EXPERIENCED DECISIONAL CONFLICT 
Study 6 examined a causal link between II and indecisiveness (Hypothesis 3). Recent 
studies in management of multiple social identities suggest that II can be successfully 
manipulated. For example, drawing from findings that biculturals with low bicultural II tend 
to have more negative acculturation experiences, Cheng and Lee (2013) asked biculturals to 
recall either positive or negative experiences related to their biculturalism, and measured 
Bicultural II before and after the recall task. They found that, compared to a control group, 
Bicultural II increased when biculturals recalled positive experiences, but decreased when 
negative experiences were recalled. Drawing from this methodological paradigm, Study 6 
manipulated II by asking participants to recall positive or negative experiences about 
managing their identities. Focusing on work-family identities as in Study 5, I predicted that 
those who recalled negative experiences about the relationship between their work and 
family identities would exhibit higher levels of post-choice regret in identity-relevant 
decision-making tasks than those who recalled positive experiences about their work-family 
identities. To rule out spillover effects of negative recall as an alternative explanation, I 
further predicted that recalling negative experiences about managing the relationship 
between work and family identities would not lead to more regret for identity-irrelevant 
decision-making tasks outside the work/family domain. Again, establishing the decision 
domain as a moderator of this relationship would support the notion that specific contexts 
may trigger relevant responses. 
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7.1 METHOD 
7.1.1 Participants 
Participants included 147 self-identified full-time working professionals with families 
(49% women; Mage = 35.6 years; SDage = 9.6 years) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
in the U.S. and compensated for their participation. The majority of participants (83%) 
identified as White/Caucasian; 7.4% as Asian/Asian American; 6.8% as Black/African 
American; and 2.7% as Hispanic/Latino/a.  
7.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Study 6 used a 3 (Recall: negative vs. positive vs. control) X 2 (Task: work-
family/vacation vs. non-work-family/brick) between-subjects experimental design. The 
procedure was similar to Study 5 except that II was manipulated (through recall) before the 
decision-making task. First, all participants completed the same Work-Family II scale used in 
Study 5 (see Appendix A) to assess their baseline level of perceived compatibility between 
their work and family identities (α = .74; range = 1.33−7.00, M = 4.14, SD = 1.38).  
To manipulate work-family II, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
identity recall conditions modeled after Cheng and Lee (2013). In the negative and positive 
recall conditions, participants were asked to “recall 10 negative [positive] experiences you’ve 
had managing being both a working professional and family person”. In the control 
condition, participants were not asked to recall any personal experiences. Next, participants 
were randomly assigned to complete the vacation (work-family/identity-relevant) or the 
brick (non-work-family/identity-irrelevant) decision-making task. Following the decision, all 
participants rated their post-choice regret using the same scale as in Study 5, with higher 
scores indicating greater regret (α = .91; range = 1.00−6.00, M = 2.49, SD = 1.22) (see 
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Appendix B). Lastly, participants filled out the Work-Family II scale again (α = .80; range = 
1.00−7.00, M = 4.12, SD = 1.43). 
7.2 RESULTS 
I first conducted a manipulation check to examine whether the recall manipulation 
had an effect on Work-Family II. A 3 (Recall: negative vs. positive vs. control) X 2 (II: pre 
vs. post) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect, indicating that 
II changed significantly from pre to post manipulation depending on the recall condition, 
Wilks’ lambda = .93, F(2, 144) = 5.24, p = .006, η2 = .068. On average, II scores decreased in 
the negative recall condition (n = 44; Mpre = 4.17, SDpre = 1.43; Mpost = 3.81, SDpost = 1.41), 
increased in the positive recall condition (n = 49; Mpre = 4.14, SDpre = 1.33; Mpost = 4.39, SDpost 
= 1.40), and remained unchanged in the control condition (n = 54; Mpre = 4.14, SDpre = 1.41; 
Mpost = 4.12, SDpost = 1.45).  
To test Hypothesis 3, I conducted a 3 (Recall: positive vs. negative vs. control) X 2 
(Task: vacation vs. brick) ANOVA. Thirteen participants were dropped from this analysis, 
because they did not complete the decision-making task. The main effect of task was 
significant (F(1, 128) = 11.67, p = .001, η2 = .08) such that participants in the vacation task 
condition experienced more regret than those in the brick task condition (Mvacation = 2.69, 
SDvacation = 1.30; Mbrick = 2.09, SDbrick = 1.00). Furthermore, there was a significant main effect 
of recall condition (F(2, 128) = 3.31, p = .040, η2 = .05) with participants in the negative 
recall condition reporting higher levels of regret than those in the positive recall and control 
condition (Mnegative = 2.86, SDnegative = 1.37; Mpositive = 2.24, SDpositive = 1.20; Mcontrol = 2.23, SDcontrol = 
.99). These effects, however, were qualified by a significant 2-way interaction between recall 
and task (F(2, 128) = 7.91, p = .001, η2 = .11). The means are shown in Figure 3. As 
predicted, post-choice regret was highest in the negative recall condition (M = 3.62, SD = 
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1.20), suggesting that lowering Work-Family II led to higher levels of post-choice regret in 
work-family decision-making tasks. The same effect was not evident in the non-work-family 
decision-making task. 
 
Figure 3. Interaction of recall condition and task on post-choice regret among working 
professionals with families (Study 6). Error bars represent the standard error of the means. 
*** p < .001 
 
 
To probe this interaction further, I conducted two multiple regression analyses, one 
per task condition, in which post-choice regret was regressed on recall (the three conditions 
were coded as two dummy codes). In the work-family task condition, participants in the 
negative recall condition were more likely to experience regret compared to those in the 
positive recall (bunstandardized = -1.28, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.95, -.62]) and control conditions 
(bunstandardized = -1.39, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.05, -.74]). In the non-work-family task condition, 
levels of regret reported by participants in the negative recall condition did not significantly 
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differ from the positive recall (bunstandardized = .21, p = .551, 95% CI [-.48, .89]) or control 
conditions (bunstandardized = .34, p = .277, 95% CI [-.28, .97]). 
7.3 DISCUSSION 
This pattern of results supported Hypothesis 3. That is, lowering Work-Family II 
using a negative recall manipulation led to higher post-choice regret, but only in identity-
relevant decision tasks. Given that this effect was not observed for the identity-irrelevant 
task, it is unlikely that negative affect in general underlies the low II-indecisiveness link. 
Indeed, these findings provide some evidence for the causal link between perceptions of 
identity incompatibility (low II) and experienced decisional conflict (indecisiveness). At the 
same time, this is not to preclude an underlying mechanism via which low II may cause 
indecisiveness.  
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CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Using organizational, student, and working adult samples, and correlational and 
experimental designs, six studies showed that individual differences in the psychological 
management of multiple identities predict indecisiveness in identity-relevant decision-making 
tasks. To summarize, the present studies found that individuals with lower identity 
integration (II)—or those who perceive their identities as disparate and in conflict—tended 
to be more indecisive. This relationship was not driven by trait neuroticism, and held across 
different decision-making tasks and different operationalizations of indecisiveness. Decision 
domain moderated the link between II and indecisiveness such that lower II was associated 
with greater indecisiveness for identity-relevant decisions only, suggesting that decision 
contexts may act as cues for relevant responses. These patterns held across different types of 
identities—organizational, cultural, and work-family—and when controlling for various 
aspects of the choice set that may make decisions more or less difficult (e.g., option 
dissimilarity; Chatterjee & Heath, 1996). Interestingly, this suggests that perceptions of 
identity conflict (low II) may affect negative decisional experiences independent of the 
degree of conflict that may be inherent between different types of identities or between 
different choice options. In other words, supporting an identity account of decisional 
conflict, the psychological management of one’s identities may be a particularly important 
predictor of experiences of conflict in decision-making. 
Furthermore, the present analysis found that perceptions of one’s identities as 
incompatible appeared to cause experienced post-decisional regret for identity-relevant 
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decisions. Again, this causal link between low II and affective indecisiveness did not spill 
over into identity-irrelevant decisions, supporting the notion that the negative affect 
associated with low II does not make people generally conflictual. Instead, it seems more 
likely that this affective response is cued by relevant contexts or situations. This suggests that 
identity-relevant contexts may not just make single identities salient but also cue people’s 
perceptions about the relationships between identities within that domain (Ramarajan, 2014). 
These findings bridge and extend literatures on multiple social identities and identity-
based decision-making to advance an identity account of experienced decisional conflict (or 
indecisiveness) in identity-relevant decision domains. As such, the present analysis follows 
recent calls from identity scholars to shift focus from single salient identities toward studying 
the interplays between multiple identities in organizations (Ramarajan, 2014). This dissertation 
therefore contributes not only to the understanding of the importance of individual 
differences in the psychological management of multiple identities—or the notion that not 
all people perceive potentially conflicting identities such as work and family identities as 
incompatible (Sanchez-Burks, 2002, 2005)—but also to the decision-making literature by 
providing consistent evidence that these individual differences matter for experiences of 
decision-making. Given that the decision-making process is expansive and includes more 
than just making choices (Yates & Angott, 2012), which to date has been the primary focus 
of identity-based decision-making work (e.g., Reed et al., 2012), the present analysis also 
extends knowledge about the role of identity for decision-making more broadly. As many 
real-world decisions occur without immediate knowledge of the outcomes of the choice 
(such as pursuing a particular career path), understanding the factors that contribute to 
negative decision experiences that occur post choice but pre outcome can shed light on why 
some people may persist in their chosen courses of action while others abandon them 
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(Kirkebøen & Teigen, 2011). These types of outcomes might be particularly relevant in 
organizations, as workplaces may represent strong contextual cues of the boundaries 
between multiple identities (Dumas & Sanchez-Burks, 2015). 
8.1 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Although this dissertation provides an important step towards studying interplays 
between multiple identities in decision-making (Ramarajan, 2014), I focus exclusively on 
identity integration—or perceptions of incompatibility and conflict between identities. Given 
that conflict is primarily affective, experiences of negative affect about one’s identities appear 
the most relevant identity experience for experienced decisional conflict. Indeed, findings 
indicated that II was associated with negative affect or regret most consistently. To the 
extent that indecisiveness is largely affective (e.g., Elyadi, 2006) and even more general 
conceptions of indecisiveness include negative or conflictual components (e.g. 
Indecisiveness Scale; Frost & Shows, 1993), the present studies also support the notion that 
low IIs are indecisive. But that is not to say that other types of identity dynamics could not 
also affect decisional conflict or other aspects of decision-making more broadly. For 
instance, social identity complexity, which has been shown to be an important predictor of 
intergroup tolerance (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), may also increase experiences of decisional 
conflict as people may be more likely to source information from various groups and 
consider more diverse perspectives when making decisions. This, in turn, may be more likely 
to relate to cognitive aspects of the decision-making process (such as deliberation), which 
although also part of indecisiveness, may in fact lead to better decisions. Considering 
individual differences in how people think about the interplays between their multiple 
identities may thus provide a fruitful avenue for future research on decision-making, and in 
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teasing apart how indecisiveness (and its various components) may be harnessed for better 
decision-making.   
How II may relate to the dual nature of indecisiveness—or, the notion that careful 
consideration of choice options may lead to better decisions whereas anxiously poring over a 
decision may debilitate the decision-maker and lead to regret—may be best understood by 
pinpointing a mechanism through future studies. Given that the present analysis did not find 
a relationship between II and the time it took participants to make a choice, it seems unlikely 
that cognitive mechanisms related to deliberation (Yates et al., 2010) can explain why low IIs 
are more indecisive. Instead, the current findings, which consistently showed relationships 
between II and affective components of indecisiveness, point to an affective mechanism. 
That is, because low II seems to be most closely linked to the experience of decisional 
conflict—or what it feels like to be indecisive—here, a mechanism that is also affective (i.e., 
self-threat; see Mok & Morris, 2013) appears most likely to underlie this relationship. For 
those with lower levels of II, because one aspect of the self feels like it necessarily excludes 
another, making decisions around even one of those identities is fraught with more conflict 
as these decision contexts cue self-threat or a sense of identity loss, a particularly negative 
affective experience. In contrast, those individuals with higher levels of II do not experience 
the same level of decisional conflict as they can be both selves at the same time (i.e., have 
integrated identities) and therefore do not perceive identity-relevant choices as threats to the 
self.  
This type of mechanism mirrors choice tradeoff models in the decision-making 
literature. People are notoriously loss averse and choice tradeoffs in which people stand to 
lose more or experience greater threat from forgoing choice options tend to be experienced 
as more conflictual or emotionally negative (Carmon et al., 2003; Krosch et al., 2012; Luce et 
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al., 1997, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Specifically, decision models of choice tradeoff 
difficulties suggest that when people trade off attributes of choice options that are 
particularly threatening (associated with greater loss)—that is, in which more of one attribute 
needs to be given up in order to maximize another—they experience greater decisional 
conflict in the form of negative emotions (Luce et al., 2001). From an identity perspective, 
rather than being a function of particular choice tradeoffs, experienced decisional conflict 
can arise from perceptions of identity incompatibility, which create an internal sense of self-
threat or inherent tradeoff between multiple selves. 
Although using self-generated ideas for the decision-making tasks in the current 
studies added to the ecological validity of the findings (as many real-world decisions involve 
the generation of options and the narrowing down to viable ones), there were also some 
drawbacks. Specifically, to test a self-threat mechanism, future studies should present one 
choice option representative of a specific identity—e.g., work identity (e.g., attending a skill-
building workshop)—and another of a potentially conflicting identity—e.g., family identity 
(e.g., attending a family camp)—to create an explicit tradeoff between identities and measure 
the extent to which people feel one identity threatens the other. By assessing self-threat 
concerns for both identities, an explicit tradeoff would also allow researchers to examine 
whether concerns about self-threat need to be “real” (i.e., about the identity excluded by the 
choice). This can help shed further light on the boundaries of perceptions of identity conflict 
for experiences of decisional conflict.  
To include more realistic measures and behavioral intentions, future studies could 
also elicit participants’ willingness to pay for particular choice options. Providing even 
greater ecological validity and moving beyond the lab, which is a limitation of most of the 
current studies, future studies could also assess these particular identity tradeoffs in real-
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world contexts such as when employees make choices between staying in the office or going 
to their child’s tennis match or even among expatriates, who have to make the choice to 
advance their career through moving overseas while uprooting and potentially 
disadvantaging their family. II between work and family identities might be a predictor of 
whether someone takes on an international work assignment and how successful they are; or 
work-family II might be higher among those who successfully complete these assignments. 
A longitudinal study that tracks the relationship between II and satisfaction with one’s 
decisions (such as throughout the course of an international work assignment) might also 
inform the directionality of the relationship between II and indecisiveness beyond what the 
current analysis could reveal.  
While I found that experimentally manipulating II predicted indecisiveness, it is 
possible that this relationship is bidirectional. Specifically, experiencing difficulties around 
decision-making may lead individuals to infer that their related identities are in conflict. This 
may be particularly problematic for those already in precarious positions—such as women in 
leadership, who are often promoted to top positions when an organization is struggling, 
putting them in situations where they have to make difficult decisions (Ryan, Haslam, 
Hersby, Kulich, & Wilson-Kovacs, 2009). In these contexts, they may experience discord 
between being a leader and a woman, exacerbating gender inequalities in the workplace. And 
some factors may affect both II and decision-making. For example, work environments in 
which situational factors may exclude identities—such as demanding work schedules that 
make it difficult for working professionals to attend to family matters—could lead to 
experiences of decisional conflict when making choices in the work/family domain, as well 
as perceptions of incompatibility between work and family identities. Indeed, exploring the 
potential mutual reinforcement of identity and decisional conflict at work through future 
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research could help shed light on the role organizations may be able to play in facilitating 
identity integration among employees.   
8.2 IMPLICATIONS 
People psychologically manage a large array of possible identity dynamics in everyday 
life (e.g., Johnson, Morgeson, Ilgen, Meyer, Lloyd, 2006). The present studies highlight how 
II can be consistently conceptualized beyond one sample, and can be validly measured and 
operationalized across populations with different identities, including various combinations 
of work-related identities such as organizational/cultural identities among local employees of 
multinational corporations (Caprar, 2011). As such, the present analysis may provide a model 
for introducing individual difference measures that capture people’s perceptions about the 
relationships between their multiple identities into future research on multiple social 
identities (Ramarajan, 2014).  
By demonstrating the importance of individual differences in shaping negative 
decision experiences, the current findings may also help shed light on why potentially 
conflicting social identities—such as work and family roles—can sometimes lead to 
interference and poorer outcomes and sometimes be a source of enhancement and better 
performance at work (e.g., Frone, Russel, & Cooper, 1992; Graves, Ohlott, & Ruderman, 
2007; see also Dumas & Sanchez-Burks, 2015). The present findings may also provide 
avenues through which organizations can leverage employee’s multiple identities. By 
reminding employees of ways in which their identities are compatible or providing 
opportunities that create these experiences—such as integrative work-family policies or 
encouraging employees to pursue personal projects—organizations may alleviate perceptions 
that other aspects of the self are threatened at work and thus reduce negative decisional 
experiences in the work domain. 
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Consistent with shifting expectations toward integrating across multiple identities 
and the benefits of integration (e.g., Cheng et al., 2008; Dumas & Sanchez-Burks, 2015; 
Ramarajan & Reid, 2013), the present set of studies shows that integration may also carry 
affective benefits for decision-making. Nonetheless, I caution against conceptualizing 
identity conflict as unequivocally negative, particularly for decision-making more broadly. 
Indeed, low II has been associated with resistance to groupthink in group decision-making 
tasks (Mok & Morris, 2010) and under-confidence and caution may be assets in situations or 
cultures that demand or value deliberation and revision of decisions (Yates et al., 2010).  
Although the immediate experience of decisional conflict may be personal—indeed, 
the current dissertation contributes to our understanding of the role of the self in the 
experience of making decisions—decision-making models highlight that decisions are not 
made in isolation. From a cardinal issue perspective (Yates, 2003; Yates & Tschirhart, 2006), 
the decisions made as well as how they were made by the decision-maker need to be 
accepted by others. And, according to the logic of appropriateness framework (Kopelman, 
2009; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004), the decision-maker places the self in the context 
of social and cultural norms during the decision-making process by asking what does a person 
like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition) given the culture (group)? (Kopelman, 
Hardin, Myers, & Tost, 2016). From these perspectives, experiencing negative post-
decisional affect may be a sign of the recognition that a decision or action was unacceptable 
or inappropriate in a given social or cultural context, which can ultimately benefit the 
decision-maker through learning and personal development as well as others, for instance 
through better interpersonal interactions or shared gains in a negotiation (Kopelman et al., 
2016). 
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Additionally, to the extent that experienced decisional conflict may motivate the 
continued consideration of forgone choice options (e.g., Carmon et al., 2003), these 
immediate negative effects might further dissipate or even reverse in the long term. 
Consideration of next best alternatives, in fact, may increase long-term commitment to and 
satisfaction with one’s decisions, including organizational commitment (e.g., Ersner-
Hershfield, Galinsky, Kray, & King, 2010). The present findings thus also provide an 
interesting avenue for future research on the possible positive effects of experienced 
decisional conflict as well as the long-term effects of identity and decision conflict in 
organizations.   
Overall, the present dissertation bridges and extends literatures on multiple social 
identities and identity-based decision-making to advance an identity account of decisional 
conflict in identity-relevant decision domains. By focusing on individual differences in the 
psychological management of multiple identities and experiences of decisional conflict, the 
current analysis sheds light on how and why people’s multiple identities matter for decision-
making experiences, particularly in these identity domains. Through a better understanding 
of these relationships, we can begin to better navigate the decisions we need to make on a 
regular basis around our multiple social identities and indeed may, like Facebook CFO Sheryl 
Sandberg, who appears to have successfully integrated work, family, and gender identities, 
become “true believers in bringing our whole selves to work” (Sandberg, 2013, p. 206).  
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A 
IDENTITY INTEGRATION SCALES 
A1. Studies 1and 2 
What is your opinion on how you generally manage your different selves? Please indicate the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
1. I am often conflicted between my different selves. 
2. My different selves blend together seamlessly. 
3. I can be described by all my different selves. 
4. I keep my different selves separate.  
5. In any given situation, I only have one dominant self.  
6. I feel comfortable having many selves. 
7. I am often torn between my different selves. 
8. My different selves give me an edge in life. 
9. Having different selves creates tension. 
10. I am best described by a blend of all my different selves. 
A2. Study 3 
Please read the statements below and rate the extent to which they describe your experience: 
1. At work, I have completely integrated the Mexican and German cultures.  
2. At work, I feel conflicted between my Mexican identity and my identity as an 
employee of a German company.  
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3. At work, I am someone whose behavior switches between the cultural norms of 
Mexico and the cultural norms of Germany. 
4. At work, I feel torn between the expectations of being a resident of Mexico and an 
employee of a German company.  
A3. Study 4 
Please read the statements below and rate the extent to which they describe your experience: 
1. I feel conflicted between my identity as a(n) [Culture 1]* and my identity as a(n) 
[Culture 2]*. 
2. I feel torn between the expectations of being a(n) [Culture 1] and a(n) [Culture 2]. 
3. I do not feel any tension between my goals as a(n) [Culture 1] and a(n) [Culture 2]. 
* Participants’ responses to the question “Please write down the two cultures you identify with (e.g., American, 
Chinese, Italian, etc.)” were piped into each scale item. If a participant entered “American” and “Chinese,” for 
example, the first item would be “I have completely incorporated the American culture and the Chinese 
culture.” 
A4. Studies 5 and 6 
Please read the statements below and rate the extent to which they describe how you see 
your identities: 
1. I feel conflicted between my identity as a working professional and my identity as 
a family person. 
2. I feel torn between the expectations of being a working professional and a family 
person. 
3. I do not feel any tension between my goals as a working professional and a 
family person. 
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APPENDIX B 
INDECISIVENESS ITEMS 
B1. Study 1 
To what extent do you wish you had chosen the other organization? 
To what extent do you regret not choosing the other organization? 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. I should have chosen the other organization. 
2. If I could do it over again, I would change my choice to the other organization. 
3. I would be happier if I had chosen the other organization. 
B2. Study 2 
Indecisiveness Scale 
Please rate your agreement with the following statements: 
1. I try to put off making decisions. 
2. I always know exactly what I want. 
3. I find it easy to make decisions. 
4. I have a hard time planning my free time. 
5. I like to be in a position to make decisions. 
6. Once I make a decision, I feel fairly confident that it is a good one. 
7. When ordering from a menu, I usually find it difficult to decide what to get. 
8. I usually make decisions quickly. 
9. Once I make a decision, I stop worrying about it. 
10. I become anxious when making a decision. 
11. I often worry about making the wrong choice. 
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12. After I have chosen or decided something, I often believe I’ve made the wrong 
choice or decision. 
13. I do not get assignments done on time because I cannot decide what to do first. 
14. I have trouble completing assignments because I can’t prioritize what is most 
important. 
15. It seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes me a long time. 
Post-choice Regret 
To what extent do you wish you had chosen your other idea? 
To what extent do you regret not choosing your other idea? 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. I should have chosen my other idea. 
2. If I could do it over again, I would change my choice to my other idea. 
3. I would be happier if I had chosen my other idea.	
B3. Study 3 
Please think about what you are generally like at work. Please rate your agreement with the 
following statements: 
1. At work, I find it easy to make decisions.  
2. At work, once I make a decision, I feel fairly confident that is a good one.  
3. At work, I become anxious when making a decision.  
4. At work, after I have chosen or decided something, I often believe I've made the 
wrong choice or decision.  
5. At work, it seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes me a long time.  
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B4. Studies 5 and 6 
To what extent do you wish you had chosen your other idea? 
To what extent do you regret not choosing your other idea? 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. I should have chosen my other idea. 
2. If I could do it over again, I would change my choice to my other idea. 
3. I would be happier if I had chosen my other idea. 
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